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DEFINING "HEALTH":
THREE VISIONS AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS
DavidS. Bloch*
William Robert Nelson Jr."

leave me unsatisfied,
"The arguments that have been offered ...
however, in the sense that I still want to hear a definition of thein
both, and to be told what the effect is of the occurrenceof each of
them ... "
-Plato,

The Republic 35Sb.'

INTRODUCTION
On August 11, 1995, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) announced
an ambitious effort to regulate cigarettes.2 Its plan, backed by the Clinton
Administration, would classify nicotine as a drug, define cigarettes as drug
delivery device, and bring cigarettes into FDA's regulatory purview.3 The
*Associate, Lynch, Gilardi & Grummer, San Francisco, California. B.A., Reed College,
1993; M.P.H., The George Washington University School of Medicine and Health Science:, 1996;
J.D., The George Washington University National Law Center, 1996; Fellow in International
Trade Law, University Institute of European Studies, International Labor Organization (Turin,
Italy, 1997).
"Research Assistant, Center for Market Processes, Fairfax, Virginia. B.S., San Diego State
University; 1994; Ph.D. (Cand.) George Mason University, 1999. The author would like to thank
Professor Tyler Cowen for his useful comments.
IPLATO, REPUBLIC 45 (Robin Waterford trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1993)
2
Aug.
CigaretteRegulation is FormallyProposed; IndustrySues to Halt It, WALL ST. J.,
11, 1995, at Al; Mark Sandalow, Clinton OrdersRules to SnuqgTccn Smoking, S. F. CHlRON., Aug.
11, 1995, atAl.
'Sandalow, supra note 2, at Al; Michael K. Frisby & Hilary Stout, Clinton to Bac:
CigaretteCurbs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 1995, at A3 (the Administration has decided to "back the
Food and Drug Administration's quest to gain regulatory authority over cigarettes. Such a
decision represents a broad interpretation of the FDA's authority. The agency argues that it should
be able to regulate cigarettes because they contain the drug nicotine"). It should be noted that the
present regulatory proposals are intended only to prevent adolescent smoking. However, the
redefinition of cigarettes as drug delivery devices will put cigarettes as a class into the reach of the
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Administration, prompted by former FDA Commissioner Dr. David
Kessler, has made no secret of its intention to use this mechanism to
sharply restrict cigarette advertising and sales.4

It is not seriously disputed that cigarette smoking is directly and
causally associated with a variety of health problems. Though tobacco

smoke is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of cancer, because lung
cancers develop in non-smokers and some smokers do not develop lung
cancer, cigarette use is clearly associated with a massively increased risk
of disease.' Regulation of cigarette use, however, raises thorny problems
regarding personal liberty.6 Ultimately, the issue of smoking regulation
centers around two related issues: how to characterize "health," and who
is responsible for maintaining it.

When we refer to "health," we do not mean "health care," but rather
health itself, or a person's physical well-being.7 Many choices, including
organ donation, choice of diet, and money spent on risky athletic pursuits,
impact a person's health. Part of the costs and benefits of certain choices
is a change in health status, and surely some actions are taken because of
their influence on the actor's health. It is thus reasonable to conceptualize
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 340 et seq. The FDA has broad discretion to
determine what substances fall within its jurisdiction, though the matter is by no means legally
settled. See Milo Geyelin, Does FDA"sPower Extend to Cigarettes?WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1995,
at B7.
Frisby & Stout, supranote 3, at A3; CigaretteRegulation is FormallyProposed;Industry
Sues to Halt It, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1995, at Al; Maggie Mahar, Blowing Smoke: Despite
Heated Attack by Tobacco Industry,FDA is Likely to Regulate CigaretteSales, BARRON'S, Jan.
8, 1996, at 12.
5

DAvID E. LILLIENFIELD & PAUL D. STOLLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 9-11 (3d

ed. 1994).
6"By calling behavior a disease, [Kessler] obscures the fact that, whenever they start,
smokers choose to continue smoking every day. They may be ambivalent about it, but they have
implicitly decided that the costs of quitting exceed the benefits." Jacob Sullum, Smoking Wars,
NATIONAL REVIEW, July 29, 1996, at 40 (italics original).
'Webster's contains two pertinent definitions of "health":
1.
2.

"physical and mental well-being; soundness; freedom from defect,
pain, or disease; normality of mental and physical functions."
"condition of body or mind, as, good or bad health."

WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY

836 (deluxe 2d ed. 1983). Litman

observes that "[t]he notion of health is a popular one: The public, for good or ill, remains
convinced of the efficacy of medicine in promoting and maintaining it and believes that future
medical advances guarantee less sickness and longer life." Theodor J. Litman, Government and
Health: The PoliticalAspects of Health Care -A SociopoliticalOverview, in HEALTH POLITICS
AND POLICY 3, 30 (Theodor J. Litman & Leonard S. Robbins eds., 2d ed. 1991).
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a person's health as a distinct object or entity, and to attempt to ascertain
its characteristics as such.8 Though health care is a controversial topic in
legal and social theory, "health" is usually an unexamined variable. This
omission is a mistake, because discussions of health care policy are
incomplete, if not misleading, without careful consideration of the
characteristics of health itself.
Before discussing any program aimed at improving, protecting, or
even harming health, it is necessary to define the concept of "health" with
reasonable precision. To the extent that theorists have considered the
formal definition of health, three broad definitions can be discerned. First,
some commentators view health as an inborn attribute, a state of being or,
at most, an inalienable characteristic. In economic parlance, health is a
non-good. A second group of theorists views health as a merit good.
Under this conception, health implicates such important societal goals (or
creates such substantial externalities), that good health becomes a social
good, benefiting both the holder of health and his community. These
social benefits are considered so central that community resources can
justifiably be dedicated to individual health maintenance. For moral or
social reasons, however, health cannot be the subject of market
transactions and, thus, is "nonsalable" or "market-inalienable." 9 A third
group of theorists views health as purely an economic good fundamentally
indistinguishable from any other purchasable item. This article develops
these three visions of health, assesses their viability, and discusses the
implications of each for government and society.
CONCEPTIONS OF HEALTH
As noted, there are three ways to conceptualize health:
(1) as a non-economic good or a non-good;
(2) as a special "merit economic good, subject to unique considerations
and constraints; and
(3) as an ordinary economic good.
8

Ve should also add a word on terminology. This article uses economic jargon, even when
discussing concepts that expressly reject the economic frame of mind and the language that
accompanies it. We use this language because it is the simplest, most direct way of
communicating what we are trying to communicate.
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (1987).
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Health as a Non-Good -The Right to Good Health
Health can be viewed as an attribute or trait of a fundamentally noneconomic nature. In effect, this means health cannot be adequately valued
by the marketplace. The mere fact that one can affect his or her health
status by conscious effort does not mean health is an economic good.
Health is either critically undervalued, or of transcendent value. There
simply cannot be a fair market exchange for one's health; because any
trade, despite the mutual willingness of the parties, is wrong. The moral
case underlying this view is that economic circumstances should never
force a person to degrade his life.'0
Rawlsian Justifications
John Rawls' theory of justice underlies this particular view of health."
Rawls proposes two basic principles of justice in society, which he bases
on a theoretical social contract that all people would enter if each operated
behind a "veil of ignorance." That is to say, not knowing if one will be
strongest or weakest, brightest or dimmest, Rawls argues each person will
agree with the following two maxims:
FirstPrinciple:
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extentsive total
system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of
liberty for all.
Second Principle:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both:
(a)

to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ...
;and

"0"Something might be prohibited in its market form because it both creates and exposes
wealth- and class-based contingencies for obtaining things that are critical to life itself-- for
example, health care - and thus undermines a commitment to the sanctity of life." Radin, supra
note 9, at 1912 (footnotes omitted). See also Roger M. Battistella, James W. Begun & Robert J.
Buchanan, The PoliticalEconomy of Health Services: A Review ofMajor Ideological Influences,
in HEALTH POLITICS AND POLICY 66, 68 (Theodor J. Litman & Leonard S.Robbins eds., 2d ed.
1991).
"See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner,Access to Health CareandEqual Protectionofthe Law: The
Need for a New HeightenedScrutiny, 12 AM. J. L. & MED. 345 (1986).
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attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions
of fair equality of opportunity.'

Rawlsian fairness dictates that inborn characteristics or diseases should
not be allowed to restrict an individual's opportunities. 13 If health is an
exogenous variable, subject to change at any time for nearly any reason
and largely beyond an individual's control, then basic considerations of
fairness require a system of laws that protects individuals from possible
health-related bad fortune.
Smoking is, of course, a conscious act. But, Rawlsian justice seeks
to protect liberty to the maximum extent feasible. It is not entirely clear
how a Rawlsian society would deal with deliberately risky behaviors,
particularly when the consequences of those behaviors are borne to some
extent by other citizens. Even with regard to diseases associated with
risky activities, the limitation of benefits is unjust in a Rawlsian society:
Medical services necessary for the treatment of heart disease, liver
disease and AIDS are clearly intended to prevent death and
alleviate serious impediments to normal human functioning.... If
such services were limited ... to avoid creating incentives for
behaviors that could promote such diseases, the fit between the
classification criteria and the objective is obviously Nveak.*
[*[D]etermining eligibility for benefits on the basis of disease
alone is not likely to serve the purpose of discouraging disfavored
behavior to any appreciable degree. Despite epidemiological
evidence that a substantial proportion of lung cancer is caused by
smoking, for example, a simplifying assumption that all smokers'
lung cancers are attributable to 1their
smoking behavior would
4
undoubtedly cast too wide a net.]
A smoker in a Rawlsian society is thus entitled to a subsidy for any illness
he may eventually develop, because adverse health is still largely a
"lottery." Viewing health as a lottery leads logically, in a Rawlsian world,
to laws guaranteeing medical care. Justifications for viewing health as a

non-good, based upon Rawls' theory of justice, result in proposals to
conceptualize health as a positive right, guaranteed in and protected by the
' 2JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 302 (1971).
"Mariner, supra note 11, at 373.
4Id. at

376 (bracketed section is footnote 132 in the original).
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Constitution of the United States.' 5 This concept has driven a welter of
proposals and policies, culminating in the creation of Medicare in 1965.16
Yet the United States has proven uniquely resistant to single-payer
medicine. It is fairly clear that the health care system implied by this view
of health is, for the present, politically infeasible.
Non-Rawlsian Justifications
If we determine that Americans are unwilling to accept the program
implied by the Rawls' view of health, the question remains whether a nonRawlsian theory of health as a non-good can promote effective public
policies. Rawls aside, the concept of health as a non-good rests on three
propositions. First, health is a positive right; and, therefore, whatever the
instrumental justification, people have a right to be healthy. Second,
positive rights cannot be alienated, meaning a person cannot sell himself
into slavery and cannot legitimately act to sabotage his own health. Third,
government is a guarantor of positive rights, and therefore is obligated to
protect and promote the health of its citizens.
Distilled in this way, the notion of health as a non-good is flawed.
The problem is twofold. First, it is impossible to fully delimit the area
covered by a positive right to health. As such, government has broad
discretion to enact protections; there is no obvious limit to the actions a
well-meaning legislature could take to protect and enhance the health of
its citizens. In effect, this becomes a grant not unlike that of the
Commerce Clause, an almost unlimited police power, permitting a wide
range of significant regulatory activity with only casual relation to health
as we understand it. "Health" could easily become a catch-all justification
for broad governmental regulation of areas once left to the States and the
people.
In the case of criminal homicide, for instance, "the duo of the
murderer and the victim could be considered the host, the weapon is
considered the disease agent, and the circumstances surrounding the
homicide fall into the environment category ....
Most public health
'"See
id.
6
'"[R]eformers at the turn of the century unsuccessfully sought to humanize many of the
demeaning aspects of charity and welfare medicine ...
they endeavored to establi.h the principle
that health services ought to be provided as a right on the basis of medical necl regardless of
ability to pay ... . After nearly 50 years of ceaseless but unfulfilled strivings, these efforts were
rewarded partially with the passage of Medicare in 1965." Battistella, Begun & Buchanan, supra
note 10, at 67-68.
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officials say [an] environmental shift must be made in the area of
homicide, and that translates to control of handguns."' 7 The logic is

seductive, but the result is illiberal because it fails to even consider the
twin matters of individual autonomy and individual responsibility, and
allows the federal government to derogate the general police power held

exclusively by the States. 8

Second, if health is a positive right, the logical response to health

threats is prohibition. Cigarettes should be banned altogether, along with
other demonstrably harmful substances (e.g., alcohol). Prohibition,
however, raises problems of its own. If the government earmarks a set

level of resources for enforcement, it must also accept that the law will be
circumvented to some degree. This was the strategy of the alcohol
Prohibition of the 1920s." The result was the creation of vast criminal
empires, the effects of which can be felt today from the docks of New
York City to the corridors of power in Washington D.C.2' In the
alternative, the government may choose to devote sufficient resources to
absolutely eradicate the trade in both legal and illegal markets. However,

to control illegal production, massive new social controls are necessary.
In effect, the alternative would create a benign, health-conscious
dictatorship.
'TNikki Meredith, The MurderEpidemic, SCIENCE, Dec. 1984, at 42,43-44,46.
"JERO1ME A. BARRON ET AL., CONSTrruIONAL LAW: PRIDCIPLES AIND POLICY

55 (4th ed.

1992). It should be noted that the modem Commerce Clause has provided the federal government
with powers that approach that of a general police power. It is clear that the Founders did not
intend such a power, since four resolutions intended to confer it %.eredefeated during the
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. Id.
19President Clinton has stated that he has "no intention of banning cigarettes, [bccauz] such
a step would be no more successful than Prohibition was at eliminating alcohol in the 19203s"
Sandalow, supra note 2, at A13.
2
That Prohibition is largely responsible for the rise of American Mafia kingpins is
conventional wisdom. See, eg., Robert K. Woetzel, An Ovrviacv ofOrganidCrime: M.orcs and
Morality, 347 ANNALS A1. ACAD. POL &SOC. SC. 1, 4 (Ilay 1963) "Thegreat watershed of the
activity of organized crime in the United States was the year when Prohibition was pas.ed. The
Eighteenth Amendment created a vacuum into which criminals stepped with force and vigor");
Alvin J. T. Zumbrun, Maryland:A Law-Enforcement Dilemma, 347 ANNALs AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. Sci. 58, 59 (May 1963) ("In the 1920's, we had the Volstead Act. It was an unenforcible
[sic] statute which provided bootleggers with funds needed to finance a criminal empire. That
mistake was corrected through legislation."); Virgil IV.Peterson, Chicago:Shades of Capone,347
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.& Soc. SC. 30, 32-34 (May 1963). But Prohibition also spavned
political empires: Joe Kennedy, patriarch of the Kennedy clan, made a sizable chunk of his fortune
as a rum-runner. NELLIE BLY,THE KENNEDY MEN: THREE GENERATIONS OF SE:,- SCANDAL AND

SEcRETS 16 (1996); DORis KEARNs GOOD Nv,
THE FITZGERALDS AND THE IW.ENTDyS 511-515
(1987).
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The Constitution of the United States is our accepted codification of
basic rights. It guarantees broad personal liberties 2' and limits the scope
of the federal government. 2 It is not within the government's power to
take the steps needed to implement a policy based on health as a non-good
or positive right. Simply put, such a positive right is inconsistent with the
Constitution as currently configured.23 Even the federal government's
broadest grant of authority, the Commerce Clause,24 cannot plausibly
encompass a "health police power." To expect the government to conduct
itself as if health were a positive right is to advocate, knowingly or
unknowingly, a significant alteration of the Constitution.
Health as a Merit Good - The
Social and Moral Dimensions
of Health
Another school of thought accepts the premise that health can be valued,
but rejects the notion that it can be bought and sold. This is a result of
health's "social dimension," or the impact of individual headth on society.
Theorists who view health as a "special" good fall into two categories:
those who justify restrictions on alienability for practical and/or economic
reasons, and those who justify restrictions on moral grounds.
Economic Justifications
There are at least three justifications for refusing to countenance a "health
market" that incorporate an explicit or implicit economic analysis:
externalities, risk of error, and democratic considerations.

2t

These liberties include speech, U. S. CONST. AM. I CL. 2, association, U. S. CONST. AM. I.
CL. 3, and marital privacy, BARRON ET AL., supra note 18, at 410-18.

'This is true both procedurally (i.e., the federal government cannot try a man twice for the
same crime, U. S. CONST. AM. V CL. 2, and only the House of Representatives has the power to
impeach, U. S. CONST. ART. I § 2 CL. 5) and substantively (i.e., "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion," U. S. CONST. AM. I CL. 1).
2
As Wing notes, "the principle remains that the federal government must operate within

its enumerated powers, and federal government activities must be justified in terms of one or more
of the explicit provisions of the Constitution." KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S
HEALTH 18 (3d ed. 1990).
24

See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct. 82 (1942); BARRON ET AL., supra note

18, at 97-106.
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Externalities of Health
The first and most important justification is the argument that individual
health has a "social dimension." In other words, health has external
effects or "externalities" that cannot be fully captured by the price it
would command on the open market.' The support for health as a special
class of goods is based on hardheaded assessments of health's economic
repercussions:
Improved health has positive extemalities: a fiduciary basis for the
alleviation of pain and suffering, rehabilitation, employment of
large numbers of people in skilled and unskilled useful labor, a
market for goods produced as a result of research, education and
innovation, social justice and political stability. As such, health
care is a "merit good" and unlike economic goods, its distribution
should not be left to the market.26
Commentators who consider health a non-marketable good contend that
there are elements of health which, though valuable, are unquantifiable,
27
such as hope, compassion, and the extension and preservation of life.
Others cite practical benefits by holding that health care is a right, and by
arguing that "spending for maternal and child health services and the
working-age population is a good investment in economic growth."23
Health's social benefits are not fully realized by the market price it
commands. Because the full social value of health is greater than its
economic value and price, market transactions in health should be
curtailed or prohibited. 29 This concept has been termed "partial marketinalienability," a state in which health is "incompletely commodified." '
The sale of such goods may justifiably be regulated in the interests of both
the public and the individual.

2Melvin Horwitz, CorporateReorganization:The Last Gasp or Last ClcarChancefor the
Tax-Exempt, NonprofitHospital? 13 AM. J. L. &MED. 527, 534 (1938).
26id. (footnotes omitted).
27
Stuart Rome, Medicine andPublic Policy: Let Us Look Before Me Lcap Again, 42 MD.
L. REV. 46,48 (1981).
'Battistella, Begun & Buchanan, supra note 10, at 68.
'iMaja Campbell-Eaton, NoteAntitrustCertificateofNccd: A Doubtfild Prognosis,69 1OWA
L. REV. 1451,1459 (1984).
30Radin, supra note 9, at 1918 n. 246.
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There are significant problems with the premise that the presence of
externalities requires health to be viewed as a non-marketable good. This
argument seems to misunderstand the nature of economic externalities:
No harmful or beneficial effect is external to the world.
Some person or persons always suffer or enjoy these effects. What
converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that
the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or
more of the interacting persons is too high to make it worthwhile
"Internalizing" such effects refers to a process, usually a
change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in
greater degree) on all interacting persons.3'
The question immediately arises as to whether a problem of externalities
can ever be corrected by reducing property rights in the good at issue.
Some theorists argue it cannot, because prohibiting the establishment of
a clear ownership right "precludes the internalization of external costs and
benefits. 32 Ordinarily, a property right internalizes externalities regardless of who holds the possessory interest. The problem of externalities
should diminish, not increase, if an individual is forced to take full
account of his health status, because the costs of his own conduct will be
reflected in insurance premiums, doctor's bills, and his financial
compensation. As a result, society will bear more of the burden if health
is only incompletely commodified.
Risk of Error in Health Decision-Making
Margaret Radin suggests (but does not advocate) an alternative
"prophylactic justification" for market-inalienability of commodities such
as "children, sexual services, or body parts." 33 Risk of error is so great in
such transactions (because the stakes are so high and so difficult to
quantify) that a rule banning all such transactions is justified on pragmatic
grounds. According to this argument, health is a good about which
ordinary people, who know little, cannot make rational decisions.
There is no reason, however, to believe government can make better
decisions. To successfully defend the risk-of-error argument, advocates
"Harold Densetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348
(1967). 2

' 1d. at 349.

"Radin, supra note 9, at 1910.
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must overcome two hurdles. First, to improve on an individual's healthrelated decisions, expert bureaucrats would need superior information
concerning the individual's current situation, future prospects, and
fluctuating desires. That is to say, the health decision-maker must have
detailed, current information about both the medical and the non-medical
situation of each individual -- a daunting prospect, and perhaps a
frightening one. Second, it is difficult to formulate an acceptable moral
justification for coercing an individual into an uncertain situation or
treatment on the basis of a bureaucratic determination of need or want.
Radin correctly describes the risk-of-error justification as "deeply
troubling," because it ultimately posits some overarching force that can
better gauge the desires and wants of persons who are otherwise willing
to make a given sale. 4 It is functionally impossible for a bureaucrat to
consistently make utility-maximizing choices on the behalf of others?'5
The "marvel" of the market is that individuals, acting without the benefit
of master plan or director, still arrive at allocation solutions superior to
those that any (human) planner or planners could accomplish. 6
The Democratic Implications of Health
A third, closely-related justification for market-inalienability is advanced
by Wendy Mariner, who notes that good health is essential to "normal,
species functioning."37 According to Mariner, "[ijn order to carry out any
personal or social goals or take advantage of any opportunity, people must
'
be able to function normally."38
Health is a good, but it is also a
precondition to any form of meaningful social activity. Thus, protection
of individual health becomes a major unspoken premise in the formation
of civil society. In order for government to continue to function, the
health of the citizenry must be preserved; and since a person's health has
implications that reach beyond his personal well-being, the circumstances
under which that person will be able to sell his health are to be strictly
limited. This is because political rights can only be enjoyed by healthy
people:

'AId. at 1910-11.
'5 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrION OF LIBERTY 254-257 (paperback ed. 1978);
Friedrich A. Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Socie4%35 AM. EcON. REV. 519, 520-24 (1945).

"5Hayek, The Use ofKnowledge in Society, supranote 35, at 527.
"Mariner, supra note 11, at 371 (citing N. DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE (1985)).
3sid. at 372.
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A

person's need for health care is usually involuntary.*
[*It is questionable whether even illnesses associated with certain
behaviors, such as smoking and obesity, are the result of
voluntarily assumed risks ...
]

In short, adequate health care is as essential to survival as the
necessities of food, clothing and shelter. These subsistence goods
and services are prerequisites to the enjoyment of freedom and the
ability to participate in the political process. Without these
essentials, there is no liberty -- to vote, hold office, speak one's
opinion, observe religion, find employment, or exercise any other
right. Absent any of these rights, the range of opportunities open
to any person narrows to the vanishing point."
By implication, though health is a good, individual health is also a
necessity and, therefore, must be protected in a democratic society. This
"serves to explain why health care is not just another economic good
which may be distributed according to the market without regard to
need."''4 Just as government cannot permit the sale of votes and preserve
a democratic society, it cannot permit the sale of an individual's health.
Good health is a precondition to equality of opportunity and as such, the
government is obligated to secure it for all citizens to the extent feasible.4"
Organ sale, risk-seeking behaviors, and smoking all pose significant
threats to democracy, and not merely to the individuals engaging in them.
The emphasis on health's democratic implications is somewhat
incoherent. It is driven by the belief that some transaction types are
morally superior to others. In fact, most justifications of viewing health
as a special good rely on distinguishing between different types of
transactions. For instance, though market transactions are socially
harmful, certain categories of gifts are socially desirable. Thus, one can
give away health but not sell it, donate organs but not sell them.42

"Id. (some footnotes omitted; bracketed section is footnote 122 in the original).
4"Id. at 373.
41Id. at 371-5.
42This is the current state of things, as discussed in, e.g., David E. Chapman, Comment,
Retailing Human Organs Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 393

(1983).
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Radin argues that this result is compelled by an inborn moral sense,
a contention discussed in more depth below.43 Here, however, it suffices
to note the distinction between gift and sale is not compelled by any moral
sense, but rather by a basic misunderstanding of the nature of trade. By
definition, trade makes both sides better off, else, absent coercion, it
would not occur.44 "In fact, trade occurs because participants find it
mutually attractive, because people place different marginal valuations on
scare goods." 45 By depriving an individual of the ability to sell healthimproving services, these theorists envision a regime willing to deprive an
individual of his well-being. It is not obvious that the homeless veteran
would be worse off with one kidney and $1 million, as opposed to two
functioning kidneys and a life of destitution. Even less clear is the metric
by which any government can rationally make such decisions.
Moreover, the distinction between gift and sale is logically flimsy.
If a person gives a gift with the intent to alter the recipient's behavior in
his favor, has he provided a gift; or has he, in effect, purchased goodwill?
Distinguishing between gift and sale is possible, but the line drawn is
arbitrary. These commentators merely favor certain transactions, such as
exchange of goods for services or goodwill, over others, such as exchange
of goods for money.
Finally, the prevention of trade denies the individual a property right
in the most personal, and surely the most privately owned, part of the
universe: his own body. This invasive element of health's "democratic"
dimension, that in the context of individual health democracy requires
rigid social controls, is profoundly antidemocratic.

43

Radin, supra note 9, at 1880.

"'Coercion, of course, is precisely the response most commentators are likely to provide,
when pressed on this point. The question then becomes whether asymetry of bargaining power
implies coercion. It may, but there is no necessary reason to believe that it does. Haye: notes,
"we are dependent for the satisfaction of most of our needs on the services of some of our fellows.
.... The benefits and opportunities which our fellows offer to us will be available only if we
satisfy their conditions.... [It is not] 'coercion' if a producer or dealer refuses to supply me vith
what I want except at his price. This is certainly true in a competitive market, where I can turn to
somebody else if the terms of the first offer do not suit me; and it is normally no less true when
I face a monopolist" HAYE, supranote 35, at 135-6. Hayek acknowledges a distinction in cases
of life-threatening illness or strict necessity.
"ARMtEN AI.CHIAN & WILLAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETIION,
COORDINATION, AND COT ROL 45 (3d ed. 1983).
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Moral Justifications
As we have seen above, the economic arguments in favor of treating
health as a merit good rest on a flawed economic belief and a series of
implicit moral judgments, like that favoring gift over sale. The risk-oferror justification also has an unstated moral dimension. Accepting that
mistakes will be made, who has the moral prerogative to make potentially
life-threatening health decisions: the individual or the state? Although
they do not explicitly say so, theorists relying on the risk-of-error
justification conclude the moral authority to make health-related decisions
should repose in the state. Other commentators build their justifications
on more explicit moral arguments.
Radin, for example, posits a "domino theory," whereby the market6
4
conception of one "borderline" good leads to a universal market regime.
This is to be avoided because some transactions are less worthy when
undertaken in a market context. To permit market transactions will
cheapen the corresponding non-market transaction involving the same
good. A non-commodified good is "morally preferable,4 7: for Radin,
blood donation is morally better than blood purchase, and selling organs
reduces the selflessness and nobility of organ donation.48 However, the
notion that the absence of a market alternative generates altruism can
apply with equal force to almost any transaction. 49 Radin's argument
against commodification per se "leads to universal noncommodification."5' In turn, universal non-commodification leads logically to a regime
in which health is a positive right.
Other commentators argue that "health care is a social good that
should be equitably distributed" 5' for unstated moral or ethical reasons.
Melvin Horwitz, for one, contends
[MIedical care is not just another economic good that is bought
and sold in a competitive marketplace. Our society protects the
sick patient with numerous legal constraints and ethical precepts.
Improved health, not profits, is the primary goal of the health care
system ... . Furthermore, markets provide goods and services at
46

Radin, supra note 9, at 1912-13.

47

1d. at 1913.

48

1d. at 1913-14.
49
1d. at 1914 n. 235.
'Old.at 1912.
5
Horwitz, supra note 25, at 557.
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prices attractive enough to entice the customer to purchase an item.
The ethical health care provider has the additional obligation to see
that sick patients get the care they need. This distinction is
important. "Markets are driven by customers' wants; the health
care system is supposed to consider health needs.' 52
This argument contains several important fallacies. Primary among them
is that Horwitz attempts to distinguish between "wants" and "needs" in a
health market. Certainly, plastic surgery is a need of a different order than
heart surgery. However, Horwitz's claim would seem to extend beyond
the premise that physicians should do what is biologically necessary, and
require doctors (and the health care system more broadly) to act out of an
inborn benevolence. His confidence in the charitable impulses of health
care providers is admirable, but is obviously not preferable to a marketdriven system of health provision.
Markets are driven by trade: people exchanging property rights in
such a manner that both expect to be better off as a result of the
transaction. This framework holds regardless of what is actually traded.
A health market is more likely to attend to peoples' needs than is a
bureaucratic system, since only in the former does the individual have a
meaningful way of translating his demands into concrete services. A
benefit of this view is that it does not require health care providers to be
of better moral stock than the rest of us; good medical care (and thus,
usually, better health) will arise from the self-interest of physicians, rather
than from the rarefied altruism Horwitz sees as a prerequisite of medical
practice.
Further, the existence of "legal constraints" does not, as Horwitz
would have it, contradict health's status as a good. That felons cannot
purchase firearms, or children under sixteen years of age cannot drive
cars, does not affect the status of motor vehicles and handguns as
economic goods. The legal constraints (and legal protections) of which
Horwitz writes do not affect the character of health or health care. Rather,
they speak to the question of responsibility. Legal rules, in this context,
do no more than hold injurers responsible for the harm they cause. At an

'2Id.

at 533-4 (footnotes omitted). Note that Horwitz is denying a claim that is far less broad

than the one we are discussing here: he rejects the premise that health care is a good. Sce also
Battistella, Begun & Buchanan, supra note 10, at 6S (pointing to Kenneth Arrow and Talcott
Parsons as the best-recognized defenders "of the idea that health is a social good").

738

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 1:723

extreme, such rules may also decide who shall pay for a given good or
service (e.g., the government, the individual, or a culpable third party).
However, the existence of legal constraints does not suggest an answer to
the question of whether health is an "economic good that is bought and
sold in a competitive marketplace." Restated, the question becomes: who
shall be held liable when an individual, though his own actions, causes
harm to himself? Is the locus of responsibility for an individual's health
the individual or the state?
In addition, Horwitz's focus on profits as a pernicious influence is
misplaced. Profits are a means of signaling that more capital and effort
should be allocated toward the fulfillment of a particular want or need.53
If a health market is allowed, profits will guide investors and fledgling
professionals to those subject areas and geographic locations where
consumers' wants and needs are most acute. Indeed, "improved health"
is inseparable from profits, since high-caliber health care providers
flourish while those causing injury rapidly collapse under the weight of
lawsuits and patient departure.54 Capitalism does not preclude charity;
rather, it requires an organization to be self-sufficient. Michael
Morrisey's syllogism, "No margin, no mission," demonstrates how even
a person motivated wholly by charitable impulses must produce enough
revenue to sustain himself."5 Absent profit, little energy would be
expended to provide for the health of the populace. This is precisely
Horwitz's major concern.
Finally, the ethical obligation of a physician to provide needed care
does not conflict with his participation in the marketplace, any more than
does a lawyer's ethical duty to perform services pro bono. The job of the
health care provider carries certain responsibilities toward the individual
patient. These responsibilities are commonly accepted and, at times, will
lead to the provision of services without remuneration. It is important to
realize, however, these costs are already part of the market's valuation of
such services. Consequently the costs do not and cannot function as an
53LUDWIG VON MISES, HuMAN ACTION 290 (1949) (referring to "psychic profit" and

"psychic loss" in the absence of monetary profit and loss).
Iff"every family has a free and fair choice among competing health plans, organizations
that make a practice of underserving their members will not last long." ALAIN ENTHOVEN,
HEALTH PLAN: THE ONLY PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO THE SOARING COST OF MEDICAL CARE 69

(1980).

55

MICHAEL A. MORRISEY, COST SHIFTING INHEALTH CARE: SEPARATING EVIDENCE FROM
RHETORIC 18 (1994).
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argument against allowing the market to gauge the value of servicesper
se.
The Middle Ground is Quicksand
The middle-ground position, that health, though technically a good, is not
or should not be marketable, is simply untenable. The phrase "nonmarket good" refers to a property right insufficiently vested or held in
common in such a way as to render it unmarketable. In the context of
health, this means an individual's health is jointly held by that individual
and by his government. But because the government has primary property
rights in health, the individual cannot market it. For practical purposes,
this is government ownership of individual health. With the connection
between responsibility and ownership severed, few of the costs associated
with health-related behaviors will be borne by the individual. The system
will accomplish precisely what it is designed to avoid, ensuring maximum
externalization rather than accurately valuing individual health. A joint
ownership system cannot provide the proper incentives to motivate an
individual's efficient maintenance of health.
The view of health as a merit good reflects the sentiments of authors
who believe health care should be subsidized in some way, whether by
government intervention or by voluntary action. These theorists object to
the notion that health can be traded on the open market, not because it
cannot be, but because it should not be. However, their objections to the
concept of health as a salable good are based on incorrect economic
assumptions. Once the errors are corrected, the theorists are faced with
two choices: (1)embrace the concept of health as a positive right, thus
validating their moral sense but inviting significant governmental
intrusion, or (2) re-examine the notion of health as an economic good.
There is no sustainable position between these opposing views of
health. As a technical proposition, once the government is allowed any
property rights in the health of individuals, the first step down a slippery
slope has been taken. In order for the slippery slope argument to be
relevant, three conditions must be met.5 First, the temptation of a
perceived improvement must be apparent. Here, such a perception is
clear. Proponents of a "mixed" view of health contend society can
improve the lives of countless Americans, if we can only accept that
5

1DAvID LAmB, DOWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE, 1-9 (1988).
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government has some role, and not necessarily a decisive one, in
providing for the health of its constituents. Second, the initial step down
a slippery slope must violate a previously accepted moral absolute. One's
responsibility for one's own actions and their consequences, and by
extension for one's physical well-being, is just such an absolute.
Finally, after the moral absolute is breached, there must be a lack of
rationally-distinguishable barriers to incremental adjustments of policy.
Where is the philosophical barrier between benign involvement and total
control, between making minor adjustments in tax treatment and banning
entire categories of heretofore acceptable activity? Outlawing any activity
with adverse side effects on the health of the participant is logically
consistent with government ownership of, and thus responsibility for,
individual health. This is true whether the government involvement
contemplated is limited or comprehensive. "[O]nce clear-cut absolutes are
replaced by indeterminate concepts, moral boundaries can become a
playgound [sic] for sophistry.""8
Health as an Economic Good
In this final vision, a person's health is understood as an economic good.
"Economic goods" are defined as "all things that we would like to have -friendships, cleanliness, health, honesty and the like -- and not merely
marketable things like milk, shoes, and cars."59 Health is a commodity
valued by comparison with other available goods in a competitive
marketplace. In this view, it is perfectly acceptable to buy and sell human
organs on the open market.60 Though the concept of an organ market is
superficially shocking, there is an important truth contained in this
conception of health.6' People can and do make rational economic
decisions regarding their health status. One can invest in one's health;
diet, vitamin supplements, and exercise all directly affect it. Without
becoming overly mechanistic, one can reasonably view check-ups as
"TThis view is implicit in e.g., Horwitz, supra note 25.
58
DAviD LAMB,
59

DoWN THE SLIPPERY SLOPE, 4 (1988).
ALCHiAN & ALLEN, supra note 45, at 17 n. 1.
'S]ociety should not view the sale of human organs any differently than the sale of other
necessary commodities such as food, shelter, and medication." Chapman, sup,-a note 42, at 405.
"1The notion of health as an economic good has, if nothing else, convinced the organizations
funding health care: "federal administrators and most industry leaders, who pay the greatest
portion of health care bills, consider health care an economic good that is bought and sold in the
marketplace, with the government providing health care for the poor." Horwitz, supra note 25,
at 557 (footnote omitted).
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routine maintenance, and surgical and specialty medical procedures as
major repairs.
At root, this view contends that virtually everything is a good. Radin
refers to it, disapprovingly but accurately, as "universal commodification":
[E]verything people need or desire, either individually or in
groups, is conceived of as a commodity. "Everything" includes
not only those things usually considered goods, but also personal
attributes, relationships, and states of affairs. Under universal
commodification, the functions of government, wisdom, a
healthful environment, and the right to bear children are all
commodities.62
Thus, health is a salable good, maintained by purchasing some level of
health care. Decisions impacting a person's health are made either
individually or in concert with a variety of paid advisers: "Under this
model, competitive 'intermediaries' or 'gatekeepers,' such as health plans,
insurance companies, or doctors at financial risk, decide through a market
with consumers which types of health care are worth their cost. The
primary protection for patients against unreasonable underservice is ...
market competition."63
There is, however, no claim to a perfect market in health, and there
are, without question, serious distortions within the health market. (4 The
premise that a consumer "will comparison shop for price and quality,
purchasing only as much health care as he or she wants,"S and engage in
exercise and dietary modification only to the extent that the utility of
improved health outweighs the disutility of the modifications, bears closer
examination.

62

Radin, supra note 9, at 1860 (footnote omitted).

63

Rand E. Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case Management, the Doctor-Patient

Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 915, 936 (1986)
(footnotes omitted).
'See Thomas L. Greaney, Managed Competition, Integrated Delivery Systems and
Antitrust, 79 CORNELLL. REV. 1507, 1509-13 (1994).
6
Horwitz, supra note 25, at 533.
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Information is the chief barrier to arriving at rational economic
choices regarding an individual's health.66 Information regarding health
is unequally distributed in favor of providers, and is difficult for
consumers to acquire and digest. 67 As a result, "decisions are more often
made by the physician than the patient.... [T]hese consumption decisions

frequently are made during unexpected, emergency situations, and are not
constrained by limited finances due to the availability of health
68
insurance.,

Skilled providers are almost always in some form of conflict-ofinterest, since they benefit financially from providing additional care.
Consumers are radically dependent on the skills and good will of their
expert physicians and other care providers. 69 However, no one doubts that
stock investments are "goods," and they are also usually made at the
advice of experts. A poor choice, made with or without help, does not
mean that the decision did not involve a market good; only that the

6Greaney, supranote 61, at 1507 ("Market interactions in health care have been distorted
by the existence of imperfect and asymmetrically distributed information, the peculiar incentives
that flow from the presence of insurance, and other market imperfections") (footnote omitted).
Poor information may explain consumers' health choices. Horwitz, for instance, contends that
non-profit hospitals persist in part because consumers trust them:
While the prevalence of third-party insurance, tax exemption and tax-free bonding
may be the most important reasons for the persistence of the nonprofit form, some
authors emphasize the fiduciary role of the nonprofit hospital as justification for
their existence.
Patients, lacking comparable medical knowledge, must place their trust in
the hospital. Unequipped to evaluate the quality, price or available options,
patients choose nonprofit institutions based on the assumption that a nonprofit
hospital is committed primarily to the treatment of illness rather than to the
maximization of profits, and thus is less likely to take advantage of them.
Horwitz, supra note 25, at 530 (footnotes omitted).
67Greaney, supra note 61, at 1510 (footnotes omitted) ("the information that is available is
distributed asymmetrically among providers, patients, and payers. To some extent, this may permit
physicians to 'induce demand' for their services; at a minimum this phenomenon makes
information costly for buyers to acquire."). Reliance on providers also creates substantial agency
problems: "Given the technical nature of medical information, the complexity of diagnoses and
treatment alternatives, and the inherent uncertainty surrounding medical judgments, patients and
third party payers find it difficult to evaluate the cost and quality of health services." Horwitz,
supra note 25, at 530 (footnotes omitted).
6
'Id. at 534 (footnote omitted).
69
Greaney, supra note 61, at 1511 n. 10; Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening,in
Markets on the Basis ofImperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 630, 658-59 n.69 (1979).
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decision-maker is not infallible. Even among professionals, "uncertainty
often prevails as to the type, amount and duration of required medical
care."7' The available evidence, which is not overwhelming, suggests
that, when tried, competition in health care provision works.7 ' This
provides anecdotal support for the notion that people are able to behave
rationally when their health is reconceptualized as private property, that
is to say, as their own responsibility.
Consider a farmer, for example, who may deliberately sow his land
wvith salt. We may look upon his actions with puzzlement, or even
disgust, but we have no grounds for preventing him from acting as he
wishes. Similarly, we have no recourse against an individual who
deliberately harms himself or engages in risky, but consensual, sexual
practices. The same farmer may harm the value of his land inadvertently;
he may, for instance, honestly but mistakenly believe Belgian endive will
be the next United States cash crop, and as a consequence, use his
property in a way that reduces its value. Again, unless we are strict
paternalists, we cannot prevent him from taking this foolhardy course of
action, though we (as individuals or collectively) may attempt to dissuade
him from it. Similarly, the individual who puts his faith in unproven
medicines, or who believes that an all-lettuce diet will extend his life, is
beyond our lawful reach.
Society can only become involved in the farmer's affairs when his
and use begins to interfere with that of others. If the farmer stages rock
concerts on his farm, or plants fast-growing kudzu, his neighbors will
have the right to seek to enjoin his behavior, or be compensated for his

7,Horwitz, supra note 25, at 534.
Critics of market-based reform frequently point to the private sector's abysmal
failure to contain costs during the "competitive revolution" of the 1980s as proof of

the futility of reliance on competition. However, close examination of insurance
practices and provider responses to the incentives of the health financing system
reveals a marketplace highly responsive to economic stimuli. Unfortunately,
[because] those stimuli were the distorted signals influenced by regulation and ...
market imperfections ...
competition often produced perverse results.
Greaney, supra note 61, at 1513 (footnote omitted). The RAND Health Insurance
Experiment proved that health care consumers can be cost-sensitive. E.=MTrB. KEELER ETAL,
THE DEMAND FOR EPISODES OF MEDICAL TREATMENT IN THE HEALTH INSURAI.CE E.PJE

r

(RAND R-3454-HHS, March 19SS); see MICHAEL A. MORPISEY, COST SmHFn.G Ia HEALTH
CARE: SEPARATING EVIDENCE FROM RHETORIc 13 (1994). The RAND experiment leaves open

the question of whether consumers will make medically prudent decisions.
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interference with their property rights.7 2 This final situation is analogous
to the case of a smoker in a public place, or a person who deliberately puts
others at health risk.
Practical Objections
Mariner makes the erroneous claim that government involvement in the
health market alters health's status as a good. Drawing on early writings
by Robert Reich, she contends government benefits cease to be economic
goods over time, instead becoming prerequisites for democratic
participation. As discussed above, health becomes not only an attribute
of democratic citizenship, but an implicit governmental guarantee:
Viewing health care as an ordinary commercial commodity to be
distributed in the market is inconsistent with the extensive degree
of government involvement in providing and financing health
services .... Changing social conditions demand a newer vision of
What is important to effective participation in a democracy. Health
care should qualify as an important interest in maintaining one's
ability to take advantage of opportunities that are theoretically
equally available to all.73
Accepting the premise that people now view good health as an entitlement
does not affect the question of whether or not health is an economic good.
Indeed, it clarifies the government's role with regard to health. If health
is an economic good, and people nevertheless view it as an entitlement
(not unlike food or shelter), then the foundations are set for a form of
"health welfare." However, this project cannot come from the federal
government absent changes in the structure of our governmental system.
Others raise the concern that viewing health as an economic good
will lead to a decline in the amount of available health-related
information, rather than an increase. Such a "voucher system explicitly
encourages people to conceive of health care as a private market
transaction between an individual patient and a health care provider or
insurance company. The very capacity of our culture to inform itself
'See Ronald Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J. L. &ECON. 1 (1960) (contending that,
in principle, any allocation of initial property rights in a free market will rcsult in an efficient
solution to problems of nuisance or interference with property).

73
Mariner, supra note 11, at 379-80 (1986) (footnotes omitted; citing Robert Reich, The
New Property,73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964)).
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about patterns of health and health care and to mount a public response
would possibly be lost in the 'stark utopia' of radical privatization." 4 The
"radical privatization" of what is now either a non-good or a merit good
would "undermine our cultural capacity to perceive the social patterns of
health problems not only as a matter of thought, but also as a practical
'
matter of data collection."75
This argument fails to acknowledge that
consumers would have a greater incentive to inform themselves if they
become responsible for their own well-being. Though government
sources of information might dry up, private information agencies are
likely to arise to provide information to consumers.
Finally, some predict the quality of care will inevitably decline if
health is commodified. Quality is incompatible with this conception of
health: "if society treats medical care solely as an economic good and
physicians share in the profits of health care organizations, the quality of
care will suffer." 76 This prediction, however, does not appear to hold with
any other service. Private mail carriers, such as Federal Express and
United Parcel Service, are at least as competent as their counterparts in the
United States Postal Service. Likewise, there is no obvious reason to
believe that private sector lawyers are substantially worse than those who
choose to work in the public sector. Also, quality is not the sole concern
in a health system, because health is not infinitely precious. The balance
between quality and cost can be set more rationally by self-interested
consumers than by bureaucrats.
Moral Objections
There is also a significant moral dimension to the condemnation of the
economic view of health. The moral objection is hardest to respond to
because it ultimately reflects the first principles of the authors and
perhaps, of the American public.' Some contend that viewing health as
an economic good will undermine equal opportunity:
' 4Rosenblatt, supra note 60, at 968 (footnotes omitted).
7'Id. at n. 24S.
76
Horivtz, supra note 25, at 534-5 (footnote omitted).

'r"Most Americans consider access to a decent level of medical care to be a part of the right
to 'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.' ... [Mre are not villing to leave the distributon of

medical purchasing powver to the market and other forces that determine income distribution."
ENMHOVEN,supra note 54, at 81. Enthoven, it should be noted, is "a strong proponent of mnrket

competition as the preferred means of organizing and distributing health care." Rosenblatt, supra
note 60, at 917 n.l.
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[T]he importance of basic health care to the preservation of
opportunity creates a moral obligation on the part of society to
insure the provision of health care services to maintain or restore
normal species functioning. Ifjustice requires that everyone enjoy
fair equality of opportunity, then a just society must distribute its
health care services so as to maintain normal species functioning.n
The objection seems not to have grasped the full implications of accepting
the economic-good model of health. Equality of opportunity is not
harmed by private ownership of health, since health would not cease to be
valuable, by any means. Rather, it would become another species of
personal property, to which ordinary legal protections and rights would
apply. A smoker, in this view, is free to harm his own property, but he
cannot behave as a public or a private nuisance, and he is certainly not
entitled to government aid if he ends up damaging his property (e.g., his
health) beyond repair. Ordinary tort-law and municipal remedies can deal
quite adequately with health-related grievances, in the same forum and
using the same rules of law that have guided Anglo-American civilization
for centuries. Health is thus easily placed in the broader context of
American social and civic life, without resorting to complicated
government schemes or the creation of new entitlements or Constitutional
rights.
Of course, some object more basically to the distinction between tort
and non-tort. Abel suggests that the American legal system should
compensate people for their misfortunes, regardless of a misfortune's
cause. Thus, harm caused by an unavoidable accident or by another
person's deliberate action is treated in the same way as deliberate selfharm. Abel opposes the principle of assessing court damages based on
pain and suffering, because such awards "commodify our unique
experience," and cheapen it in some sense.79 In effect, thi3 proposal is a
rejection of the entire common-law system of dispute resolution; it is not
clear that Abel has provided for an adequate alternative to stave off a
return to vigilantism and vendetta.

7'Mariner, supra note 11, at 372.
79
Richard Abel, A CritiqueofAmerican Tort Law, 8 BR J. L. & SocTY 199, 207 (1981);
see Radin, supra note 9, at 1876 (discussing Abel).
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Radin locates the objection to the market conception of health in the
intuitive sphere: "for all but the deepest enthusiast, market rhetoric seems
intuitively out of place here, so inappropriate that it is either silly or
somehow insulting to the value being discussed."''
Unfortunately,
Radin's "argument" here is in fact a simple value judgment. That Radin
finds the notion of "personal attributes as fungible objects" to be
"intuitively wrong" does not render it either empirically inaccurate or
useless as a conceptual tool. Radin's dislike of the notion of health as an
economic good is visceral.
Using rape as an example of a situation in which "bodily integrity"
cannot be seen as a "fungible object," she writes:
Thinking of rape in market rhetoric implicitly conceives of as
fungible something that we know to be personal, in fact conceives
of as fungible property something we know to be too personal even
to be personal property. Bodily integrity is an attribute and not an
object. We feel discomfort or even insult, and we fear degradation
or even loss of the value involved, when bodily integrity is
conceived of as a fungible object. 8'
For Radin, viewing health (or other bodily attributes) as a commodity is
"threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person that
which is integral to the person."' , At root, she is framing a slippery-slope
argument: "if my bodily integrity is an integral personal attribute, not a
detachable object, then hypothetically valuing my bodily integrity in
money is not far removed from valuing me in money. For all but the
universal commodifier, that is inappropriate treatment of a person' 3 But
tort laws, actuarial tables and insurance contracts all value people in
money, without the dire consequences Radin predicts.
Radin acknowledges that absent some limit-setting tool, pervasive
regulation in favor of health is inevitable. She proposes "human
flourishing" as her yardstick: health-related policies should be evaluated
by determining to what extent they limit or advance human flourishing.'
Radin concludes that human flourishing demands that health, and the body
"Radin, supra note 9, at 180.
S21id.
(footnotes omitted).
SId.
at 18S1.
3Id.

4MId.
at 1884.
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in general, be viewed as a market-inalienable good, which can be given

but not sold.85 Unfortunately, this "standard" is impossible to
independently identify and describe. We must, as a society, wait for
Professor Radin and others to tell us precisely what is required for humans
to flourish.
The concept of human flourishing seems to be reducible to the
proposition that people should be permitted to seek those right-thinking
activities that improve their minds or expand their spirits, and may be
prevented from taking acts that do not. This is an idea with a
distinguished, if undemocratic, pedigree whether discussed in terms of
Marx's "false consciousness, '86 Rousseau's "forced freedom,"3 7 or Plato's
reign of the philosopher.88
In this way, Radin raises the question of accountability. If the
individual makes a decision that ends in an unsatisfactory outcome, it is
his own fault and he shoulders the responsibility. If his well-being or life
is placed in jeopardy by a decision of the state, he has no recourse and is
simply a victim. The state cannot, by its nature, be held accountable for
"'Market rhetoric, the rhetoric of alienability of all 'goods,' is also the rhetoric of alienation

of ourselves from what we can be as persons." Id. at 1884-5 (footnotes omitted).
86Cf., e.g., ERICH FROMM, MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN 20-21 (1969) ("it should be noted that
Marx ...
believed that most of what men consciously think is 'false' consciousness, is ideology and
rationalization; that the true mainsprings of man's actions are unconscious to him.... [A]ccording
to Marx, they are rooted in the whole social organization of man which directs his consciousness
in certain directions and blocks him from being aware of certain facts and experiences").
""[W]hoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so by the entire
body; which means only that he will be forced to be free." JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON TlE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 55 (Roger D. Masters ed. & Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978)
(1762).
8'R. C. CROSS & A. D. WOOZLEY, PLATO'S REPUBLIC: A PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY 108109 (1964) ("It is not over-cynical to conclude that Plato thought it was more important that the
most competent men should rule than that less competent men should have a say in deciding who
should rule; and that the freedom accorded to the Economic Class was an exceedingly limited or
even spurious freedom, the freedom which they would be allowed only for so long as they used
it in the way which Plato wanted.")
Radin's vision is reflexively left-wing. Thus, Radin indicates that "we should not accept
a conception of human flourishing that excludes our understanding of politics as (also) community
self-determination, excludes our understanding of reproductive capacity as essentially human and
personal, and excludes our understanding that the pain of witnessing criminal acts and unjust
institutions is not like the price of shoes or snowplows." Radin, supra note 9, at 1884 n. 131.
Abortion becomes an integral part of "human flourishing," rather than merely a contested political
issue. Radin's article never supplies a satisfactory definition of"personhood." See id. at 1909-10.
Without such a definition, her argument is ultimately reliant on her own conviction that her
political intuitions are superior - an unstated belief that she should be (or at least could be)
philosopher-king.
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such decisions. Accountability can only be secured if health is an
economic good, and it comes at the inevitable cost of security. If health
is an economic good, people should be able to bargain it away. Private
parties would, in this model, be able to contract as to the amount of risk
each is ,viling to take.S9 They will be held responsible for the full
implications of their own decisions. This is perhaps a more frightening
world than that envisioned by the theorists we have discussed, but it is
also a world in which legal consistency and freedom are enhanced.
CONCLUSION
Considering these three views of health, it becomes clear that only two can
produce viable public policy options. Health must be viewed as either a
socially-guaranteed positive right and, thus, as a non-good, or as an
economic good and, thus, as personal property. The impulse to find a
middle ground is quite understandable, since both conceptions are, in their
own ways, quite harsh. However, there is no conceptually reasonable way
to split the difference: either a person is entitled to good health, or he is
entitled to do what he likes with his health. The economic view of health
implies a world in which we, as a society, accept the prospect of people
making catastrophic mistakes about their own well-being. The noneconomic view of health implies a government that involves itself deeply
and intimately in the lives of its citizens, in ways inimical to personal
liberty. Policy-makers should be clear as to what philosophy of health
underlies their plans.
America has seen several proposals to alter the way health is viewed
and the way health care is provided.9" To reiterate, there is no middle
ground, and each vision of health leads to a fundamentally different set of
ideas for what is to be done. Whichever view our society chooses to
embrace is a matter of both personal philosophy and public policy. Before
the next round of health reform we must all decide where we stand.

"Rosenblatt, supra note 60, at 930, n.57 (discussing "a new generation of proposals to
of malpractice standards by contracts between providers and patients").
allow modification
9
Litman, supra note 7, at 15-18.
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